THE UMBEYLA. CAMPAIGN.

A Lecture By Captain **FOSBERY, V.C.,**
Her Majesty's Bengal Staff Corps.

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LECTURE.

Friday, April 12th, 1867.

MAJOR GENERAL SIR VINCENT EYRE, K.C.S.I., C.B., R.A.,
the Chair.

THE UMBEYLA. CAMPAIGN.

By Captain **FOSBERY, V.C.,**[1] Her Majesty's Bengal Staff Corps.

The CHAIRMAN; I have much pleasure in introducing to you Captain Fosbery, who will read us a paper on the Umbeyla Campaign, in which he bore so distinguished a part as to earn the decoration of the Victoria Cross. Although a subject of four or five years' standing, I have no doubt it will be found to contain some novel features most interesting to the present audience.

Captain FOSBERY: I should have hesitated to accept the kind and flattering invitation given me to address you to-day, had it not been for some considerations which I will, if you please, briefly lay before you.

My hesitation was caused by distrust in my own power of telling the story of this campaign as it should be told. I felt that in the short space of an hour it would be most difficult to fill in those details which give life and reality to the fossil remains of a despatch or blue book, and general interest to figures, only to be exhumed from those difficult strata by some unusually patient explorer.

On the other hand, I reflected that the story contained many episodes of interest to every soldier ; and that were it told, however imperfectly, some valuable political and military lessons might yet be drawn from it ; some more wide-spread interest not unworthily excited in scenes where have been gained the experiences, formed the reputations, or dug the graves of some of England's ablest soldiers ; some attention, drawn perhaps also to considerations which, unknown or -unheeded now, may by-and-bye force themselves (and terribly, too, should we be unprepared) on the attention of the entire nation.

India for England, as Algeria for Frame, has been aptly called the nursery of soldiers, but whilst France has kept her whole army instructed in the lessons learned in that nursery by a portion of it, we have neglected on our part to do the like. Algeria gave France her Zouaves and Spahies ; her military rifle was invented for its conquest ; the tentes d'abri were devised to lighten the equipment of her flying columns ; and an admirable system of mountain artillery and military train, so organised as to unite rapidity of movement with efficiency in action. A hundred other military improvements, thus originated, have pervaded her entire army to its great and lasting benefit.

Few French officers of standing are ignorant of the tactics to be adopted in an Arab campaign, or of the methods of maintaining, moving, and fighting with success a column in that difficult country. Their artillery, commissariat, and transport also are always ready for instant and protracted service.

1 Now Major Fosbery.—ED.

Comparatively few English officers know what Indian mountain fighting means; the remainder, when brought face to face with a brave, numerous, and formidable enemy, on ground very different from the valleys of Aldershot, or the plains where so many of our triumphs have been won, are apt to find the ordinary regulations, manuals, and drill books less than what is necessary for immediate success. English courage and English resources eventually win the day, but both courage and resources are often wasted in the winning. True, we have men such as Neville Chamberlain, Reynel Taylor, Wilde, Vaughan, Green, Probyn, Keyes, Brownlow, and others, whose very names are a terror to the tribes with whom we are continually in contact; but they are so, not merely because they are brilliant soldiers or diplomatists, but because they possess a special knowledge, not possessed by the rest of our Services; an experience, too, which unhappily dies with them.

It may be objected that the Umbeyla campaign was a little warone of those little wars we occasionally wage, which attracted the attention of not one man in a hundred in England; and further, that the soldiers present were sufficient for it. To this I would venture to reply, that ere its conclusion, the movement of troops in support extended to Meerut, more than 400 miles from the scene of action ; that it caused a most grave excitement in Asiatic minds from Calcutta to Cabul, and beyond it ; and that towards the end of December, 1863, on this account alone, there were no less than 25,000 men in motion west of the Jhelum, whilst 36 British officers and nearly 1,000 men, were killed or wounded, during the course of the operations. Besides this, in a country ruled by the sword, no war can be a little one whose result will certainly decide the attitude of the warlike tribes outside a frontier of hundreds of miles in length, and possibly excite to action the tens of thousands of secretly hostile fanatics within it; both issues hung on the conduct of this Umbeyla war, and account for the anxieties of some of the highest authorities in India. Nor was it successfully concluded, but by the determined attitude of Sir Neville Chamberlain, who (like Nelson) would not be recalled; of Sir Hugh Rose, who, approving his determination, vigorously supported him by a most rapid and effective concentration of troops; and finally, by the decisive action of Sir William Denison, who on his arrival, steadied the councils of the administration, and in his concise and able minute, pointed out clearly enough, the disastrous results of hesitation, failure, or retreat. But if this war really involved such great results as it may be shown it did; if similar expeditions are to be again undertaken (on a continually increasing scale), and should it not be impossible that we may become eventually engaged in very extensive operations in these same mountains for the very maintenance of our Indian supremacy; then, it cannot but be well to draw attention to points, the careful consideration of which, may materially influence our success. On these grounds, therefore, I venture to deliver this lecture, asking you to bear with its many imperfections.

After a brief description of the locale of the war, its causes, and the enemy against whom it was fought, I propose to consider its. plan, conduct, and results, and conclude by drawing attention to such considerations as seem most worthy of attention.

In doing this, I will if you will permit me, here and there quote from descriptions of my own, written at the time, and repeat occasionally such opinions then expressed, as have not needed modifications by the light of knowledge subsequently obtained.

I must further express my great obligations to Colonel Adye's able resume, entitled Sittana, and to the sketches, photographs, and plans which he has kindly permitted me to copy.

The ostensible cause of this war was the insolent conduct of a body of Hindostanee Mussulmen, fanatics of the Wahabee sect, under chiefs named Moolvie Abdoola and Syud Mobaruck Shah. This body of men, recruited from lower Bengal, and further strengthened by the presence of rebel sepoys, who had escaped their just chastisement at the time of the great mutiny, had taken up their residence at Mulkah, a town on "one of the lower spurs of the Mahabun mountain, or " hill of the mighty forest," as its name stands translated into English. This colony, whose earlier history is well told in Cunningham's history of the Sikhs, until the year 1858, had been placed at Sittana, within sight of our frontier (the opposite bank of the Indus). From this point they crossed the river by night, harried our villages, drove off our cattle, and carried away the wealthiest men for ransom into the fastnesses of the hill. This became unendurable, and in that year a force was placed under the command of Sir Sidney Cotton for their chastisement.

Crossing the river, he captured and burned the village, and bound by treaty the surrounding tribes, to prevent the return of the colony who had, with few exceptions, escaped. They soon built a new town at Mulkah, in the heart of the Mahabun, and for a time remained quiet. But it was well known to our frontier men, that the behaviour of this colony, placed beyond our borders, was but the manifestation of the sentiments of the fanatics within it, by Whose contributions it was maintained, and by whose orders it acted; and the Umballa State trials of 1864 showed conclusively how widely-spread was the conspiracy, how perfect was the organisation, and how well prepared the treason of those who planted this thorn in our side.

It might have been well to have let them live as a political barometer, had this been the only point in question—two thousand enemies, more or less, being of little consequence to our Indian Army. But when to Sittana and commenced plundering on our territories, drilling on the one side of the Indus, and firing at our troops on the other, it became evident that something must be done.

This conduct did not only mean that some few fanatics were getting troublesome, but it meant also that the tribes on our border were becoming careless of treaty, and defiant of our power, and might any day join in the depredations, and share the plunder of the lawless colony, all participations in whose actions, however, they as yet disavowed. It also meant that a disaffection was spreading within our own territories, and as we had not then the clue to the soul of the question, it became necessary to apply an adequate punishment to the body represented by this Sittana colony, and act on mind, as has been so often done before, by dealing with matter.

The question then arose, how were they to be reached and effectively punished, placed as they were in the immediate neighbourhood of powerful tribes, whom it was undesirable to provoke, and with whom they might take sanctuary and so escape. A glance at the plan of the position they occupied will show the difficulties under which we laboured.

Mulkah, their settlement, was most strongly situated in a cup, or hollow, high on one of the spurs of the great Mahabun mountain.

This mountain, by some supposed to be the Hill Aornos, which cost Alexander the Great more than two years of fighting and a large pro-portion of his army, is situated in a bend of the Indus, isolated from the remainder of the chain of hills, on the one



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side by the Chumla valley, and on the other by the plains of the Eusofzaie, our proposed base of operations. Could it be possible then, without serious resistance, to gain the line of the Chumla Valley holding the Eusofzaie, as we did, on the one hand, and the fords of the Indus on the other, the colony, and, as we hoped, the war, would be confined to this comer; and to the attitude assumed by its tribes, the Koodookehl and Judoons, which would almost certainly be hostile, the force to be sent against them could afford to be indifferent.

Not so as to the other tribes, however, who were warlike, numerous, and formidable, the best swordsmen and the best marksmen on the frontier and but few amongst whom had, from past experience, learned to respect our military power, or dreamed of the extent of our resources. With the Boneyr tribe, indeed, we had been always on good terms, and with them our line of route would bring us most nearly in contact. But it soon became known that the colony, hearing of what was probably in store for them, had sent out emissaries amongst the tribes for the purpose of arousing the fanaticism, always latent in the mind of every Mahomedan, however lax his religion, and the fears and jealousies of a naturally suspicious and jealous race. There was an excitement amongst them which might possibly be allayed, but on the other hand, easily increased into active hostility. Fanaticism, moreover, is one of the most capricious as well as the most formidable of human motives.

The problem, therefore, was to reach the Chumla Valley with as little offence to any one as possible, having done which, every hour's march would remove us further and further from those to whom it was inexpedient that offence should be given. There were two ways of doing this, either by the Durrun pass or that of Umbeyla. The use of the Durrun pass, from the nature of the country, would entail more labour on the troops. That of the Umbeyla offered a greater offence to the tribes with whom we desired to remain on good terms, for it was the one communication between the key of the Boneyr country and the plains below, and the Goroo Mountain, which rose from the stream at the bottom of the pass, to a height of 6,000 feet on its northern side was exclusively theirs, while the pass itself they considered exclusively their own also. That we had foreseen this difficulty was proved by the means taken to overcome, or rather get round it.

The force to be employed, consisted of some 5,600 men of all arms, including the 71st Highlanders, 101st Bengal Fusiliers, half battery of Royal Artillery, under Captain Griffin, the Huzara and Peshawur Mountain Train guns, 100 sabres of Colonel Probyn's famous regiment of Horse, 100 of the Guide Cavalry, 4 regiments of Punjaub Infantry, 1 o Goorkahs, and the 32nd Bengal Native Infantry. It assembled at Nowakilla, in the Eusofzaie, on the 12th of October, 1863, and General Sir N. Chamberlain assumed the command on the 17th.

The greatest secrecy was observed, not as to its objects, but as to the means to be taken for attaining them.

The Durrun Pass had been the one selected by Sir Sidney Cotton for an expedition into the Mahabun in the year 1858. lt was but six miles distant from the camp at Nowakilla, and through the tribes prepared for defence at both points, it was natural that they should suppose we would select this one in preference to the other.

In order to confirm them in this opinion, a small force under Major, now Colonel, Keyes was sent to encamp opposite its mouth, and this manœuvre was instantly followed by a concentration of the enemy, who began stockading the pass, and showed

themselves in large numbers on the hills flanking it On the night of the 19th October, General Chamberlain broke up his camp; and transmitting orders to Colonel Keyes to join him at Pernouli, and a proclamation to the Boneyr tribe, assuring them of our friendly intentions towards themselves, he marched on Roortum Bazaar, en route for Umbeyla.

His march was well contrived, a description of it therefore may not be uninteresting. A night march is always an uncertain and trying thing ; but by forethought and good management, the troubles of this were reduced to a minimum ; still it had its disadvantages. In night marching, there is always, first of all, the difficulty of getting clear of camp. In India it is a scene of most extraordinary, and at first apparently hopeless confusion. The groaning of camels, the unparliamentary language of men who break their shins against tent pegs, or tumble over ropes, the shouts of those unfortunates who have lost their regiments, horses, or servants in the darkness, mixed up with the blows of mallets on the tent pegs, and words of command from every possible direction, make a din that must be heard to be appreciated ; even after the fall in and when every man is in his place, the guides are generally missing, and on this occasion were so, long enough to deserve the fervent blessings of the entire force, which they duly received as they went to the front.

At last the advance sounded, Field Officers mounted, the British subaltern threw away his cheroot and fell in, and the long column was off, steering to the N.N.E., through a dark and cloudless night, and feeling its way at the rate of some two and three-quarter miles an hour. The night was cold, and the wind from the hills bitter and piercing. The road, a village track at best, gradually became merged in fields and cultivation. But presently, at half a mile distance, a bright light, like a star, flashed oat, and gradually grew larger and brighter, and on this the march was directed. As we advanced, a second and a third appeared at regular distances. The first soon resolved itself into a blazing fire of dry thorns, sheltered by a mat screen from the wind and the view of the hills. Round it were seated some four or five gipsy-looking men. These rose as the force came up, and, shaking back their long hair, gazed in undisguised wonder at the great moving cloud of dust, out of which flashed into their circle of light, now the long teams and bright appointments of the heavy field battery, now the red coats and white helmets of the British line, the Khaki uniforms of the frontier force, or the blue turbans and glittering lance points of Probyn's horse. Then, as the last of the column passed, they turned and dashed out the fire, whilst another and another springing up beyond, defined the distant road, and guided the force from light to light till the morning. Here and there a deep sandy ravine occurred, when strong working parties of Europeans, with drag ropes, ran the guns down and up the steep banks, and kept all going. At last came the chill wind that always precedes the first streak of day, so well known to every one who has marched by night in India ; then a greyish light, and the first note of some wild bird from the jungle, and then the jagged hill line began to show out, high against the eastern sky, like a ruined wall, seemingly close to us. Presently the day broke, the force mounted a long slope, and halted in echelon of regiments on high ground above Roostum Bazaar, having travelled about eleven and a half miles since starting. After a hasty meal' and deliberate pipe, we were off again, leaving the round towers and mud walls of Roostum to the left, and changing direction more to the eastward, we pushed through the lower grounds towards the base of the hills. These soon began to close in on either hand. A glance to the right showed us the baggage of Keyes' column winding through an opening in the lower range, and looking

picturesque enough in the blue misty air of the early morning. At last we entered a long, broad valley, which narrowed gradually as we proceeded, till, after crossing a small clear stream at Surkhowa, we were fairly in the mouth of the Umbeyla Pass.

The pass proved to be nine miles in length, and was for the last portion of it, intricate and difficult. Nor was it possible to maintain much military order, except at the very slowest pace. Here was seen a mule being dug out of a crevice by sappers, while II. M. Infantry halted and swore at the delay: there a jamb of mountain train ammunition or stores, the beasts kicking and screaming twenty deep in an angle of the water. Now a few inexperienced men would push forward in a likely direction on the flanks, and being brought up by impenetrable jungle, or the edge of a precipice, return growling. Then a block would occur to the front, when the entire force sat down to drink cold water or smoke the pipe of patience. Fortunately there were none to hinder. Had the enemy occupied in any force any one of the formidable defensive positions which the pass offered, there might have been trouble; for once a false alarm of fighting, to the front, showed how difficult it would have been to have united the troops in any part of the pass for attack or resistance. But the brunt of what little fighting took place, had been borne by the advanced column, who had crowned the heights on both sides of the gorge, and proceeded according to the established rules of mountain warfare.

As the hills bounding the road were frequently intersected at right angles by almost impassable ravines, it was at first sight a puzzle to us how this was managed so quickly and efficiently as to keep the leading column well in advance of those that followed, and the pass at the same time entirely free for them.

The process was pretty and soldierlike: two of the leading companies were pushed up on either flank, the enemy if disposed to be trouble- some, got. a shell from the mountain train, then the infantry charged, and cleared them out, and that pair of hills was safe. Coming down at their leisure, the men fell in in rear of the column, whilst two more companies ascended the next hills in their turn and covered the advance, which was steady and well conducted, as might have been expected from its leaders. At last the force reached and occupied the most formidable gorge of the pass, at that point whence its streams flow two different ways, to the rear to join the Cabul River, to the front to traverse the Chumla Valley and fall into the Indus under the dark shadows of the black mountain. Then however the march ended, neither guns commissariat, or baggage having arrived ; nor was all fully up until four days afterwards. Those four days were sufficient to complete the combinations and assemble the forces of the tribes whom the route chosen, had ,exasperated, and the two miles of that march unfinished on the 21st of October, remained so until the 16th of December, two months later.

Pending however the arrival of the baggage, on the 22nd of October, General Chamberlain sent out a party of cavalry under Colonel Probyn, to reconnoitre in the plains beyond, sappers to improve the road by which the force was to reach them, and a regiment of infantry to occupy the pass in front during both operations. The cavalry avoiding the village of Umbeyla, which practically though not geographically belonged to Boneyr, took the southern side of the plain and proceeded as far as Kagah without resistance, finding the road practicable for troops of all arms. On their way they perceived large bodies of the tribes assembled at the Boneyr pass, who however professed their intentions to be peaceable unless an attempt should be made to enter their pass or country.

The time occupied in the reconnaissance however was sufficient to change their resolutions, and on the return of the cavalry, Colonel Probyn found himself opposed by a considerable body of the enemy, posted in strong ground to dispute his return. He therefore on their commencing to fire, at once charged them vigorously, cutting his way through them and went up to camp. The sappers and the 20th Native Infantry then became engaged, and Colonel Brownlow was followed in the dark and difficult ravine, by a large body of the enemy, who not only fired continually, but closed with the rear guard, sword in hand, at every moment.

Two miles of this work brought him to the pickets of the camp, and these in their turn becoming engaged, a heavy night attack followed, blood was shed on both sides, and we were at once committed to a war with the tribes, of which no one could guess the extent. To have advanced now would have been to abandon the line of communication by the Umbeyla pass to the mercy of the Boneyr tribe. And to take the line of the Chumla Valley after abandoning it, would have been to place the force between the Boneyr tribe and their allies on the one hand, and the tribes of the Mahabun on the other, with an unknown country, whose physical difficulties had already been found to be formidable enough, increased ten-fold by the hostility of' these tribes in rear.

The Umbeyla pass was said by those who had seen both, to be more formidable than that terrible Khyber pass so disastrous to the army of Cabul ; the Mahabun mountain was absolutely un-known. Under these circumstances General Chamberlain decided, and doubtless most wisely, to maintain his communications with his base, and suffering himself to be attacked where he stood, to give the tribes a proof of our power, which should convince them of the helplessness of long withstanding it. He accordingly- took up a position on the crest of the pass, and pushed up outposts on his flanks on either side, giving orders that these posts should be strengthened by stockades or breastworks as far as possible. He also ordered up the troops necessary for keeping- open his communication, and placing his guns in position, remained for a time on the defensive.

The situation was truly a peculiar one. The small portion of the pass occupied by the force (about 200 yards in width at that point), and filled with huge rocks in every direction, was dominated on both sides by almost precipitous hills ; 1,500 feet up, the distance between them was only 800 yards, which gives a fair idea of their sharp angle of ascent.

From below, the ridges immediately commanding the camp were plainly visible, and on these it was proposed at first to establish out-posts, but on reaching these points, it was discovered that they in their turn were dominated by strong positions further up in the hills, and it thus became necessary to push post after post, into the mountains one either hand until the process was only stopped at the Eagle's Nest, on the left flank, and the Crag picket on the right by the impossibility of adequately relieving or supporting the troops at greater distances. As it was, no relief from below could reach the Crag picket in less than 45 minutes, nor the Eagle's Nest in less than one hour from the time of leaving the camp below, and as these posts were invisible from thence, assistance when required must be sent for, which practically doubled the distance.

Roads too had to be made to connect these posts and breastworks for their defence, and the work entailed great fatigue on a large proportion of the force.

But whilst the inefficiency of his carriage, together with the unforeseen difficulties of the pass had so far thrown out the General's calculations, as to place him in an almost purely defensive position, the dangers of that position were unfortunately aug-

mented by the nature of the defences constructed. When timber, earth, or stone is available in large quantities, it ought not to be difficult on favourable ground to throw up such a defence as might be held against any enemy unprovided with artillery.

The examples we have seen of Bootaneese bamboo forts, Burmese stockades, or New Zealand pahs, show that the merest savages know how to do this, and to do it well. We however, as a rule, I fear, neglect such precautions, and over-confident in our arms and courage, often content ourselves by placing the smallest and most unscientific obstacles between ourselves and our enemies. The slight dry stone walls at first built here, barely covered their defenders from the enemy's fire, in some cases the troops inside could scarcely fire over them, in others the enemy could; flank defence on the one hand, and defilade on the other were almost entirely neglected.

These little posts were too often constructed rather with regard to the immediate presence of materials and natural form of the ground, than to its defence, and the garrisons who occupied them suffered accordingly. The Eagle's Nest picket lost half its garrison from the enemy's fire during four hours from these causes alone, and the Crag picket, though strongly garrisoned, was twice taken by the enemy, simply because no flanking fire on any one of its faces was provided for. The moment such fire was obtained by building of a trifling outwork, the enemy ceased at once to attempt it.

We are strong, well armed, and well disciplined, and knowing ourselves to be so, we are too apt to forget that fanaticism, the elan of a body of men who are content to die for one good blow at their enemy, will often give them for a moment a superiority over the best troops in the world.

It has often been asked why do tyrants so rarely die by the hand of the assassin. The answer is simply because no conspirator can be found, notwithstanding all professions to the contrary, who will undertake to fire the shot or plant the dagger, with the clear understanding that his death, without hope of escape, must follow the next instant. All hope to get off somehow, and the act of looking back mars the enterprise.

But amongst the fanatics of India you will find hundreds of men who will band themselves together with the very purpose and intention of gaining a death at your hands, so long as they can kill you. They accept and triumph in the death itself, without arrière pensée of any kind, and thus become enemies not to be despised by the most skilful and bravest soldiers.

Of this character were some of those who opposed the force under General Chamberlain, and to their reckless bravery are to be attributed many of the casualties that took place. In some instances they actually clutched the muzzles of the cannon, cutting desperately at the gunners, in others they threw themselves fearlessly at the slight breastworks, leaping, sword in hand, amongst their defenders, and either becoming the leaders of a successful assault, or dying the glorious death they fairly earned.

On the 26th of October, the enemy attempted the extreme right of camp, but were detected in the act by Colonel Keyes, who soon after daylight took the initiative, and drove them along the crest of the ridge from one position to another, until they finally took post at a place known afterwards as the Conical Hill. As they were in great force and he had but 200 men, he halted on the ridge opposite, at a distance of about 650 yards, and sent to camp for reinforcements. These, consisting of mountain train guns, European marksmen, and a Goorkah regiment, owing to the distance, did not arrive until nearly two o'clock.

The range of the enemy's position having been then ascertained by means of rifle shell, and fuzes cut and adjusted accordingly, marksmen were placed in position, and given their distance ; the guns masked by sections moving in front of them, were dragged by hand into position. The sections then suddenly wheeled back, and the guns and marksmen opened at once on the top of the hill. The effect was almost instantaneous ; the enemy completely taken by surprise at the weight and accuracy of the fire so suddenly brought to bear on then, began to waver, when Colonel Keyes, at the head of his regiment, dashed across the plain, stormed the position, and 'drove the enemy pell-mell in the direction of Laloo, capturing a standard, and cutting them up in the operation and several of the force, then returned to camp.

The men of Colonel Keyes' regiment, the old Cokes Rifles, so distinguished at Delhi, performed a sort of war dance round the captured standard, to the music of the sirinai, an instrument in sound much resembling the bagpipe, the Europeans loudly cheering them as they marched past. An officer paused to look at this performance, and admire the fine physique and warlike bearing of these wild soldiers. Ah, said another, " you are astonished at this ; that's only a standard they have there. At Delhi these Pathans used to do the same thing, but they did it round the heads of their enemies."

Though beaten however, the enemy were not discouraged ; they had arranged for a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the camp, but somehow the Boneyr people failed to keep to their engagement, which gave great offence to their allies. The next day, however, the former determined to redeem their pledge, and threatened the Eagle's Nest and pickets on the Goroo mountain in great force. The General, therefore, reinforced these posts, placing the left defences under Colonel Vaughan. High above the Eagle's Nest picket placed on the extreme right of the line of defence stood a large sunga or breastwork of stone, which commanded that work, whilst its entire face was subject to enfilade. To its left and at a lower level was a line of troops, posted amongst broken ground, whose left flank rested on a knoll, on which were placed the mountain train guns. Presently the enemy gave a great shout, and waving their swords and standards, rushed down to the attack, their marksmen dropping into every place of shelter, and firing rapidly to cover the advance of the sword and spear men, who came up to the attack with great boldness ; but between the base of the slope and the rocks on which the picket was placed, was a little plain, some 80 yards in width, and here they became fully exposed to the fire from the work, which was so close, accurate, and deadly, that four hours' fighting left them foiled, with a loss of some 300 killed or wounded. The European marksmen alone are said to have put hors de combat 180 men, losing 7 of their own number, whilst an English officer and 40 other men lay killed or wounded inside the post, being nearly half the number originally employed for its defence.

This action necessitated a far stronger occupation of the slopes of the Goroo Mountain, and still further weakened the force in the valley below. Breastworks were now built across the ravine at the two extremities of the camp, batteries constructed, and guns placed in position for their defence, and stone walls run up for a considerable distance into the hills on either bank, to cover the troops employed.

On the following day the Boneyr men came in under a flag of truce, asking permission to carry off their dead. They did not seem humbled or beaten: frankly admitted their defeat, but, pointing towards the great mountain, said there were many warriors there to take the place of those they were now carrying for sepulture to the burial-places of their fathers. Certain, however, it was,

that some of their principal men had fallen in the assault, and there were vacancies at their council fires, which the tribe could. ill afford. They now established a series of small posts on inaccessible points of the hill, outside the defences, and searched out with an accurate and constant fire the greatest part of the camp, causing several casualties, and specially annoying Captain Griffin's battery. To this fire it was extremely difficult to reply with effect, and the marksmen of the European regiments were constantly employed in this service.

On the 30th, having previously received large accessions of force, with whom came also the Ackhoond of Swat, a spiritual leader, whose position as regards these tribes is compared, by Sir N. Chamberlain, to that of the Pope of Rome towards Catholic countries, they planned a simultaneous attack on the right, left, and centre of the position. That on the left, or Eagle's Nest, was abandoned on the failure of the other two, which were, however, delivered with great energy and considerable judgment.

The Crag picket, which you see in the sketch here, had hitherto been only occupied by Colonel Keyes (whose position is shown below) as a post of observation, and on the night of the 29th was occupied by twelve men only. The enemy, however, seeing its importance and the command which its possession would give them, approached it towards morning, overpowered and drove out the feeble garrison, and occupied the summit of the rocks with some 250 men, the remainder waiting on the ridges in the neighbourhood to take advantage of the confusion which their fire must produce at daylight in the posts below.

The nine survivors of the picket, however, retreated only as far as the rocks at the base of the Crag itself, and, opening fire on the enemy above, who were busy strengthening their position, called loudly for support.

Colonel Keyes at once answered this appeal. Taking with him an officer and ten of his own men, he proceeded to join them, directing his adjutant, Lieutenant Pitcher, to bring- up more men as fast as they could be got together.

By dawn he had with him some seventy-five men at the foot of 'the rocks, on whom the enemy poured a continuous and heavy fire, hurling down at the same time huge stones, which caused several severe hurts.

As soon as it was light enough to distinguish friend from foe, and his left flank was covered by Colonel Brownlow's corps, who moved out into the ravine below, he divided his force into two parties, gave the order to fix swords, and sounded the charge. The Pathans gave a wild shout of "Allah ! Allah !" (in the name of God) and rushed at the Crag, scrambling like cats from rock to rock, by ways through which but one man could pass at a time, in the face of a hot fire and heavy shower of rocks and stones.

This daunted some of the men and Lieutenant Pitcher who was leading at the time being stunned' by a heavy stone, but two officers, Colonel Keyes and another, and about twenty-five men, arrived at the summit where they became engaged in an exciting hand-to-hand conflict. Colonel Keyes was severely wounded, but the place was won. The nature of the struggle may be judged of from the fact that sixty of the enemy's killed and wounded were left on the ground, three standards captured, and the rest of their force was so much discouraged by the action as to retire from that flank altogether. Meantime an attack had been made on the front of the camp, which was repulsed by the 71st and 101st regiments, aided by the fire of the guns in position, and a dashing charge made by the Goorkahs, in which, however, the latter suffered severely. Their dead, when brought in, were found to have

been shockingly mutilated *by the enemy, and from this time it came to be an understood thing, that in this war, quarter would neither be asked nor granted on either side.

A story is told of an officer who, seeing a stir upon the hill side amongst the European. troops sent out to the scene of an action fought two days before, and a large group assembled about some object on the ground, ascended a rock above them to learn the cause. A curious sight presented itself. In the centre lay the mutilated body of a slain comrade, and at its head stood a non-commissioned officer with a Testament in his hand. Man after man came up, and to each was ad-ministered a solemn oath that from that day out they would neither save nor spare, but pay that debt to the uttermost.

That oath was afterwards well kept, and many a tall Pathan recreant sepoy and fanatic Moslem read his fate in the stern eyes and pale compressed lips of those who had sworn to give no mercy.

The enemy's attacks now became intermittent, and for a curious reason. Before dying. it behoves every good Mussulman to repeat a short prayer, failing which his soul is exposed to vexatious delays and inconveniences on its road to paradise. An exemption to this rule is, however, permitted should his death take place on his Sabbath, our Friday.

In their wars with one another, the sword or small matchlock ball was seldom so instantly fatal as to preclude the performance of this rite. Our bullets, shrapnel shot, and shell, were, however, on trial, found to be less considerate, and many a pious Mussulman pined in the cold, outside that heaven he had died to win. There was but one remedy, and in future they fought their more considerable actions on their Sabbath only..

This arrangement proved welcome to the force. The change of base was effected, Pemouli being selected as the depot in place of Roostum Bazaar, and the Pass of Kanpoor made practicable for the communication, to replace that of Umbeyla, which it was proposed to abandon. Preparations also were made for transferring the whole force from the ravine itself and the heights of the Goroo Mountain, to a position on the south side of the pass at the head of this road, and communications were pushed on towards the plain in advance, for the future use of the force.

To do this with safety, strong covering parties were sent out to cover the working parties and sappers employed. A Friday intervening, however, during the continuance of these operations, these parties placed at a considerable distance from camp, from which also they were separated by deep and all but impassable ravines, became surrounded by the enemy, and only regained the position with the loss of their leader, Major Harding, who, refusing to leave his wounded to the mercy of the enemy, paid for his chivalry with his life, of Ensign Murray, of the 71st, and Lieutenant Dougal, of the 79th, who were both killed, besides 34 others killed, and 37 wounded. Amongst the latter were Oliphant, of the Goorkahs, a man of a name famous in India, and the gallant Battye, of the Guides, brother of that Battye who like him was struck down in the fore front of battle, and whose latest words when dying were " Dulce et decorum est pro patriamori." His conduct, and that of other officers on the summit of the hill, alone saved the covering parties from a more serious disaster ; and it was not until late at night that all returned to camp. Thence could be seen bodies of the enemy with torches, following on the line of the retreat, slaying the wounded, and plundering the dead. Stragglers now and then arrived ; and one man, a private of the 71st, who had been stunned by a heavy fall amongst the rocks,

did not arrive until dawn on the following morning, having escaped, by what seems almost a miracle, the parties of the enemy who patrolled the sides of the hills.

This was the first success which the enemy were able to obtain, and it encouraged them proportionably. After this, however, there was again a pause, during which the enemy received reinforcements from Bajour and the more distant tribes, and their parades on the level ground near Umbeyla became imposing by their strength, and picturesque, from the numbers of gaily coloured silk standards which they carried, and the costumes of the different mountain men. On the night of the 12th of November they attacked the Crag picket, which had been greatly enlarged, and now contained 160 men ; and from nine o'clock in the evening until three in the morning, to the number of some 3,000 men, used every effort to force the post, Colonel Brownlow, who had before so successfully defended the Eagle's Nest, was, however, in command, and judging by the attitude of the enemy that an attack was imminent, further strengthened the position, during the last few hours of daylight, by every means in his power. He threw up traverses to intercept the heavy enfilade fire from the opposite ridge, 400 yards distant, and by dusk had every man in his place, and prepared for the coming attack. Presently Captain Hughes' guns from the position in rear, threw a couple of shell into the enemy's watch fires, which they at once quitted, and descended into the ravine below. here they were sheltered from the fire of the work, and nothing but a dull murmur told the defenders that a numerous enemy, bent on attack, lay within 80 yards of their slight defences.

Now and then could be heard some impatient chief marshalling his followers for attack, and, last of all, the deep voices of the Moolahs, or priests, who blessed their " enfants perdus," and promised the joys of paradise to those about to die. Then a pause, and then arose a shrill, wild cry, so wild and shrill that for a moment no one recognized it as the war cry of the Moslem "Allah ! Allah I" but it was instantly taken up by 3,000 deep voices, and, with a wild shout, their heavy column quitted its cover and rushed at the breastwork.

Colonel Brownlow waited their approach and then suddenly poured into the mass a fire so close and deadly, that nothing living could face it, and perforce they retired ; in half an hour they returned to the attack, and were repulsed as before. Again and again they attempted to storm, and still the fire of the works mowed them down as they came to close quarters. At last making a most determined attack on both sides of the weakest angle of the post at once, hurling large stones on its defenders, whom they confused and overwhelmed by the suddenness and vigour of this new mode of attack, they got at the wall itself, pulled it down, threw the stones on the defenders within and were masters of the corner.

Many men of the garrison commenced to retreat, but Colonel Brownlow, calling for volunteers and getting but four or five, rushed at the place, turned the invaders out, rebuilt the wall, and held it for the remainder of the night. The guns also from their position, 250 yards in rear, guided, as to range and direction, by voice from the post, opened fire, throwing shell over the top of the rock into the ravine beyond and doing good service, and though attack after attack followed, Colonel Brownlow maintained his position with success, until the morning.

At three the fighting ceased, both sides being weary, and the enemy having suffered considerable loss. Then a strange incident occurred. One of the enemy taking shelter under a rock within 20 yards of the post, called to the garrison in Pathan patois to know if they were not tired of all this noise and gunpowder—for his own part he freely confessed he was—to this a reply was made that they were quite ready to go on. " But," said he, " don't you think singing is better than fighting, sit quiet for a little and I will sing"—and without further pre-face he began singing in song after song, the wild strains of love and war, which stir the hearts of these mountaineers. The troops on our own side, many of them recruited from these very hills, took up the chorus and from the deep ravine, where his friends lay, came a chorus louder than ours, and now and then a sound of applause which plainly showed how numerous and how near they were. He was addressed from the post and complimented on his singing and bravery, and asked if he would not take service with the English, who would duly estimate both qualities ; to this be replied, " we have quarrelled and not yet settled our quarrel, when that is done I will consider"— and firing his matchlock at the post in defiance, he dived into the ravine, and was no more seen.

Colonel Brownlow's men who had been 48 hours on continuous duty were relieved soon after daybreak by Captain Davidson and men of the 1st Punjaub Native Infantry. The enemy almost instantly made a new attempt, stormed the post before the men were fairly in position, killing Davidson, who refused to leave his post and died as a soldier should, and a large number of the new garrison with him. The place had therefore to be retaken, at the point of the bayonet, by the 101st Bengal Fusiliers, under Colonel Sainsbury. But pending their arrival, the advance of the enemy was stopped by the fire of mountain train guns, and the heroic behaviour of three or four officers, notably Lieutenants Pitcher and Young, who collecting a handful of men charged them so vigorously as to save the main pickets, and give time for the arrival of reinforcements.

Colonel Keyes, though still suffering severely from his wound, showed the greatest coolness, and held the breastworks successfully, at a time when everything was in the utmost confusion, when there were but few good men available for defence, and a mass of camp followers, panic-struck soldiers, and baggage, blocking in their flight, the only road to the camp below. Colonel Sainsbury, as soon as he arrived, at once formed his regiment for attack and stormed the Crag, heading the assault, which was made with that dash for which his regiment, as well as himself, have long been celebrated.

Slight skirmishing followed this affair, but on the 18th of November the arrangements for the movement having been completed, General Chamberlain decided on retiring his left flank and concentrating his whole force in rear of what was before called the " Right advanced pickets."

Drawing off by degrees his men and material from the slopes of the Goroo mountain by 10 A.m., on the morning of the 18th of November, his force, having performed a most delicate and difficult movement, had occupied, without molestation, a strong position on the southern side of the pass, and had changed their base of operations, line of communication, and military position at one and the same time. But here the enemy interfered. This instance, were there no other, would conclusively shew the justice of the opinions of Sir N. Chamberlain, and those who supported him, in his refusal to retreat, not only on account of the impolicy, but also on account of the danger involved. The enemy mistook this change of position for retreat, and thereupon organized one of the most formidable attacks delivered during the whole course of the operations.

They followed up the retirement in great force to the lower pickets of the new position, drove out their defenders, and, but for the determined resistance of the troops, would have entered the camp itself. Here were killed Smith, of the 71st ; Chapman, the Adjutant of the 101st ; Murphy, of 14th Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Jones, a volunteer from the 79th. Lieutenant Chapman, knowing his wound to be mortal, begged, but in vain, the retiring troops to assist Captain Smith, and leave him to his fate. Both were, however, killed, and their bodies not recovered until the 21st.

On the 20th the Crag picket, then garrisoned by two companies of European troops, was again taken by the enemy. Two Officers were killed, together with a large number of their men ; and Major Delafosse, one of the two survivors of the Cawnpore Massacre, in vain displayed the greatest bravery, in the hope of rallying the men, and still holding it.

The post was retaken by the 71st Highlanders, under Colonel Hope, who, moving out from the breastwork, advanced, in face of a tremendous fire, steadily, and without a single break, to the summit, to which two roads had by this time been constructed. This they did without the smallest appearance of hurry, their pace being regulated by Colonel Hope himself, who, briefly saying, " 71st, you have to take " that post, and to follow me," led them up the hill, and was the first man to enter the work. Here, however, he was unfortunately severely wounded, as was General Chamberlain, who accompanied the assault, and the force was thus deprived of the services of its two Senior Officers.

This was the last great attack delivered by the enemy. On this day, too, the late Major Hugh James, Commissioner of Peshawur, arrived in camp whilst the fight at the drag was going on, having just returned from England. He was supposed to know more of the characteristics, relationships, and interior policy of the tribes, than any other man who had occupied the same position. At the same time, General Chamberlain received a telegram authorizing him to abandon his position and retire on Pemouli, but this, though wounded severely, and in spite of the heavy losses the force had sustained, he refused to do. Major James supported him in this determination, representing to the Government that though matters were very serious, retreat could only make them worse, and set himself to sow disunion amongst the tribes pending the arrival of reinforcements. This he did in a simple but most ingenious manner. which shows the suspicious nature of these men, as well as their simplicity. He had with him a body of native levies, who formed a means of communication between ourselves and the enemy. Some of these levies he assembled in front of his tent, and, producing a huge bundle of letters, told them they must take them to the enemy's camp.

Then, seeming to reconsider the question, he took out a certain number, saying, Ah ! well ; I won't write to so and so ; he has so little influence ; or so and so, for his followers are so few ; and making some disparaging remark about each chief named, he burnt the letters addressed to them, to the number of about one-half. The rest he charged the spies to give to the remaining chiefs, with a request to take them away from the council fire, and read them quietly.

His orders were carried out, and whilst one-half were away reading their letters, the others, jealous of their distinction, cross-questioned the spies, and discovered from them the remarks which had been made on themselves by the Commissioner. On the return of the other chiefs, they were called on to show their letters, and these were found to contain nothing beyond a few ordinary compliments. " Ah ! " said the others, "that won't do. Where's the letter promising you money for " deserting our cause ? " These,

of course, never existed, and the poor men had none to show ; but the neglected chiefs could not be persuaded to believe it, and such mutual mistrust was engendered that the Boneyr tribe never again united to attack us ; so that the attack which entailed the fall of the Crag picket, proved to be their last.

The force now, with but small interruption, awaited its reinforcements, the enemy during the same time also receiving great accessions of strength. Indeed, the excitement spread along the whole border, and attacks were made on us at other points by tribes who had long been neutral or friendly. On the reinforcements fully arriving, and the force reaching a strength of 9,000 men, General Garvoch, who succeeded Sir Neville Chamberlain when the latter was disabled by his wound, commenced a forward movement, in anticipation of the enemy's proposed attack on camp, of which he had received intelligence.

Moving out with two brigades, he drove them along the ridges of the southern range, and took the Conical Hill by storm, as also the village of Laloo, which he burned. He then bivouacked for the night. In pursuance of their original plan, however, large bodies of the enemy had entered the valley, and learning how large a number of troops had quitted the camp, made a strong and well sustained attack on the advanced positions. These, however, under Colonels Brownlow and Keyes, resisted all their efforts, and mortars having been brought into play for the first time, searched out with their fire the ravines winch had before sheltered their parties, almost within stone throw of our works ; and Colonel Keyes at length, by a brilliant charge, drove them pell-mell into the valley below, whence they did not return. On the 16th the force descended from the hill, taking and burning the village of Umbeyla, and offered battle to the enemy in face of the very key of their country. Colonel Probyn had led his sabres down from the heights, nearly 2,000 feet, into the plains by paths supposed to be barely practicable for mules, and menaced any of the enemy who might venture into the open. Their cavalry prudently concealed themselves in the broken ground, and saved their lives thereby. Captain Griffin, who had got his half battery down carrying the guns and carriages on elephants, now horsed it, and passing the village at a gallop, took up a position on the right, and opened fire with shell and shrapnel. The enemy gradually retired, and two regiments thrown out as skirmishers pressed their movement. Presently, however, a horde of Ghazees, or fanatics, 250 strong, came out of a ravine which had hitherto concealed them, and in an instant dashed at the line, cutting right and left, and causing some confusion. The regiments were driven back by the mere force of the onset, almost as far as the supports which Colonel Turner had echeloned in their rear. The enemy, who witnessed the conflict from the pass above, already began to descend the pass with loud shouts. The retirement, however, lasted only a moment, and, closing with the attacking party, the Pioneer regiments exterminated them to the last man.

This action closed the campaign. The Boneyr tribe submitted, and asked for orders. Their allies had now fled, and they were informed by the Commissioner that, to prove their good faith, they must send a force to Mulkah, and destroy it. They gave hostages for their performance of this compact, which they religiously fulfilled, several British officers accompanying them, to see the work done. Amongst these was Colonel Adye, and the drawing before you is a copy of a sketch of his, taken on the spot, and showing a portion of the town. The troops, with the exception of a small column sent to coerce some of the smaller tribes, who had not yet submitted, now returned to their cantonments.

The main points to which I think the story calls attention are the following:--1st. As it was by the deficiencies of carriage hastily collected, sad organized on no regular system, that the force was delayed long enough to permit of the combinations of the tribes, it will be seen that for successful bill expeditions, excessive lightness of equipment and efficiency of transport should be insisted on. 2nd. Considering the delays which the bringing up of reinforcements entailed, no force should attempt to enter these hills without a strong reserve close at hand. 3rd. Mountain-train guns of greater length of range and accuracy, are required. The 12-pound mountain-train howitzers did good service, but the 3-pounder guns comparatively little, being inaccurate at any distance, and their light projectiles being useless against the smallest dry stone wall. Batteries of European artillery, having Armstrong or Whitworth guns, of not more than 2½ cwt., each, and of long ranges, might with advantage be organized for frontier service.

4th. A body of marksmen, carrying long range rifles, and trained, organized, and equipped for the arduous work of the hills, would form a most valuable adjunct to any force destined to operate there. The mountain men are themselves first-rate marksmen, seldom throw away a shot, and respect an enemy for the like qualities ; they despise him for the want of them. The marksmen of Her Majesty's regiments employed during the campaign, did excellent service, but not being trained to the work, suffered severely from its harassing nature, and from wearing dress and accoutrements designed for the parade-ground, or at all events for tolerably level country. 5th. We learn that no care expended on the field works, however small, was thrown away ; whilst the want of it was often disastrous in its results. No officer should be ignorant of the necessary precautions to be taken in tracing a work, nor the height and proportions of his breastwork. 6th. Abatis, if constructed at all, should be solidly made and judiciously placed, and traverses thrown up where necessary, and all this, not under the enemy's fire, but as a part of the plan of the work during its original construction. Then, as the front or flanks of any position taken up amongst such mountains as these, is sure to have deep ravines in its immediate neighbourhood, which will always serve as places d'armes to the enemy, mortars should be provided to dislodge them from situations in which neither musketry nor artillery fire will touch them. It continually happened during the Umbeyla war that such ravines formed the cover from which their most formidable assaults were. delivered, and until the last few days the force had no means of dealing with them until the attack had actually commenced. Hand grenades, too, and some means of throwing a strong light in the front of the positions during the night attacks, of which many took place, would have been of most essential service.

The Americans have perfected a system of this kind ; they also, instead of abatis, used telegraph wire, tied from tree to tree, which had the effect of stopping a charge, and detaining the enemy for a few moments under fire ; this was exactly what was required here. Strong wire, such as is used in the telegraphs in India, is also the very material required for supporting and binding' together an abatis not exposed to the fire of artillery.

The Americans applied artificial light for both attack and defence in a most ingenious manner. The light was so arranged that a screen left either the defenders or attacking- party in complete darkness, whilst throwing a strong reflection on their enemies, and some simple connivance for producing and directing light in such a country as this would be of the greatest advantage.

The hand-grenades, improvised of soda-water bottles filled with powder, and having a small piece of port fire stuck in the neck, were wholly useless. Few men had the courage to light them, and the throwing them over the breastworks, in their hurry to be rid of them, extinguished the port fire ere it was well lighted ; thus of all that were prepared, not one did any service. The fuze of a hand-grenade can-not be so extinguished, and a supply of them would have been most useful.

At the commencement of this lecture I alluded to the necessity that might some day arise for extensive operations in these hills, for which it would be ill to be unprepared. In vindication of this allusion, allow me to draw your attention to the map before you, which indicates both the nominal frontier of Russia, and her actual advance beyond it. This may not be an immediate menace to our Indian possessions, but I do not hesitate to affirm that the matter needs immediate and earnest attention, wise forethought, and careful preparation. It has been of late years the fashion to deride what used to be called Russo-phobia—a feeling which in old times led to the occupation of Cabul, and our connexion with the Dooranee Empire.

Our statesmen now advocate a policy of non-intervention in central Asia and the consequence is, that whilst Russia is advancing steadily to the line of the Syr Daria--Alexander's base of operations for the conquest of India—we are unwilling to give even moral support to those who are opposing to this progress, a gallant, though unfortunately useless, resistance.

But whilst in Europe a policy of non-intervention may be understood, and possibly even respected, in Asia, it is quite unintelligible to the native mind, and is but too often supposed to be dictated either by weakness or fear. We now find that the envoys from Bokhara, who during a whole year in vain solicited our aid, even in the shape of one or two British officers to sit at their councils (could no more be done for them), are at present at Moscow ; and the negociations on which they are engaged, will doubtless lead to a further extension of Russian prestige and the Russian frontier.

That Russia keeps a keen eye to India, notwithstanding what may be said to the contrary, may be gathered from the fact, that her spies penetrated the entire country during the mutiny, and that letters written in Russian narrating every circumstance that occurred were captured at the time. Where, as in Asia, prestige strengthens almost incalculably the hands of the ruling power, her gain must be our loss, and her successes, even though not directly against ourselves, may lead to most serious trouble by the encouragement they will give to the lawless men of our border.

Major James suggested, and Colonel Adye strongly recommended, a change of policy towards these men, and that instead of vainly attempting to coerce them by force, we should rather endeavour to win them to our side by measures of kindness and conciliation. This may or may not be possible, but either way, the surest guarantee of peace, is a perfect readiness for war.

Time will not permit my further pursuing this subject, but should I have succeeded in drawing the attention of others to one or two points which I so sincerely believe to require it, this lecture will have fulfilled its object, and the story of the Umbeyla Campaign not been told in vain.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your kind attention.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure that all present will agree with me, that we have heard a most admirable lecture upon a most important and interesting subject. I think few will be disposed to deny that such papers have very great value to all Englishmen, and that the present paper may be said to have a special value, when, as Captain Fosbery has pointed out, our northern frontier is likely to become the scene of still more important military operations than any that have hitherto occurred in that region. Such life-like sketches as we have heard from one who has himself borne a part in the -active operations of the campaign, must always be of great interest. Certainly, it may be considered as one of the advantages of this Institution, that it presents opportunities for explaining to Englishmen that which at all times is so difficult of apprehension. Nothing, perhaps, is more difficult than for English people to understand the occurrences which take place from time to time in so distant a region as India, and which exercise a very important influence upon our national history. I am sure the present company will support me in offering our cordial thanks to the Lecturer. As Colonel Adye is present, and has himself entered largely into the subject of this lecture, perhaps he will favour us with a few observations.

Colonel ADYE, C.B., R.A.: I should like to explain for a moment with regard to the position of the Russians in Central Asia. If you look at an old map of Russia, of 40 years ago, you will find that the Russian frontier was far north of the Jaxartes, whereas we know what has happened since the Crimean war, that they have taken the line along the Mustau mountains They have got steamers on the Caspian; they have sunk a line of wells across the desert ; and they have got steamers on the sea of Aral. They established themselves, first of all, on the Jaxartes, with forts down that river; therefore, that became their line. In the meantime they also advanced from Semipolatinsk; In the year 1844 they came down this line, and we know now that they have got their outposts on the crest of the Mustau mountains. We have at the present moment frequent telegrams from St. Petersburg of fighting in Bokhara. They are doing on the Oxus what they did a few years ago on the Jaxartes, and I believe they have got as far as Charjooe. They are, apparently, taking a line down the Oxus. Our advanced post is at Peshawur ; there is, therefore, now nothing between the Russians and ourselves but Affghanistan, of which Cabul is the capital. What appears to me is this, that we should cultivate, if possible, the friendship of the Affghans, because they are not only a very warlike and fine race of men, but they really hold our natural frontiers: that is to say, they hold the great line of the Hindoo Koosh mountains. At the present moment, we have a very bad and dangerous frontier ; we are in the air. I do not say we should advance, because we should get into interminable war with these people ; but I do think, if we could succeed in gaining their friendship and confidence, we should have in that, a great barrier against the Russians. I do not say that the latter are enemies, but they may be enemies ; at all events we have this powerful nation coming down towards us. We have already advanced our frontier 1,600 miles to Peshawur, and I think everybody will see that these Affghan mountains form the natural frontier for the English..

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting is very much gratified by what Colonel Adye has said. I trust that Colonel Adye may be induced to give a lecture upon the subject. In the present critical state of matters, such a lecture would be of very great advantage, not only to members of this Institution, but to the British public.

TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER

Traditional anthropological research conducted among tribes inhabiting remote areas where insurgents and criminals operate has become increasingly difficult to implement. Studies carried out among people living in small-scale societies now are nearly impossible due to the physical dangers associated with the civil and religious unrest found in those areas. Swat, for example, has become so dangerous that Frederick Barth's studies only could be repeated at the risk of the investigator's life. Similar research is not feasible among Burma's Rohinga tribes located on both sides of the border with Bangladesh, as well as with the Pashtuns in Afghanistan's interior and within Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where even Pakistan's army enters with reluctance.

Given the difficulties of conducting direct fieldwork in conflictive areas, the Tribal Analysis Center utilizes an indirect approach. Using multidisciplinary research, we seek to collect and analyze data obtained from a wide variety of sources, both current and historical. In the absence of new ethnographic fieldwork to update our base of knowledge, the Tribal Analysis Center compiles and summarizes existing research and documents on tribal societies, combining this material with contemporary press reports and articles. We assume that much can be gleaned from well-informed observers who are not anthropologists, ranging from journalists and travelers to government officials.



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